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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
TODD MULDER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 20070511-CA 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO ARGUE THAT 
MULDER'S CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING SHOULD 
MERGE INTO HIS CONVICTION FOR AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Mulder must show that 
"counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment," and that "counsel's deficient performance was 
prejudicial - i.e., that it affected the outcome of the case." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 
76,119, 12 P.3d 92 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)). 
Here, trial counsel's performance was both deficient and prejudicial. 
Presently, counsel was deficient in their failure to argue that the aggravated 
kidnapping charge should be merged into the aggravated robbery charge. The merger 
doctrine, as outlined in Finlayson, recognizes that merger of two or more separate crimes 
may occur when a defendant is convicted of both a kidnapping and a crime in which a 
detention is inherent, such as sexual assault or robbery. See, State v. Finlayson. 2000 UT 
10, f 23, 994 P.2d 1243. The Court explained, "[b]y definition, every rape and forcible 
sodomy is committed against the will of the victim and therefore involves a necessary 
detention, which is of course, required by the kidnapping statutes. Thus, absent a clear 
distinction, virtually every rape and robbery would automatically be kidnapping as well. 
Id. at f 19. See also, State v. Mecham, 2000 UT App 247, \ 29; 9 P.3d 777 (recognizing 
that detention, "whiie not an element, is inherent in most aggravated felonies.'). 
To prevent double punishment for essentially the same offense, Finlayson outlines 
a three-prong test to aid in determining whether or not there is a sufficiently clear 
distinction between the robbery and the kidnapping so as to support separate convictions. 
[I]f a taking or confinement is alleged to have been done to facilitate the 
commission of another crime, to be kidnapping the resulting movement or 
confinement: 
(a) Must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the other 
crime; 
(b) Must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the other crime; and 
(c) Must have some significance independent of the other crime in that it 
makes the other crime substantially easier of commission or substantially 
lessens the risk of detection. 
Id. a t ! 23 (quoting Kansas v. Buggs, 547 P.2d 720, 731 (Kan. 1976)). 
Although this is not a novel issue and has been addressed by the Utah appellate 
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courts, the present facts are distinguishable. As such, Mulder asserts that under the three-
prong analysis proffered in Finlayson, trial counsel was ineffective for not arguing that 
merger applied. 
A. The detention of Allgood was "slight, inconsequential, and merely incidental" 
to the aggravated robbery. 
The State asserts that the determining factor in whether or not the detention is 
slight, inconsequential or incidental depends on whether or not Allgood removed the 
handcuffs upon leaving (Appellee Br. at 25). The State argues that because Campbell did 
not remove the handcuffs after taking the property, such action constitutes a continued 
detention unnecessary to the commission of the aggravated robbery (Appellee Br. at 23). 
Although Allgood remained handcuffed after Campbell fled the scene, any perceived 
detention created by handcuffing Allgood was slight and inconsequential as distinguished 
from precedent. 
For instance, in State v. Lopez, 2001 UT App 123, 24 P.3d 993, this Court 
addressed whether the defendant's kidnapping merged with the assault. In Lopez, the 
defendant, infatuated with his estranged spouse, dragged her from her apartment, and 
down stairs while holding her in a headlock. Id. at fl 6-7. After the defendant dragged 
her down the sidewalk and tried to force her into his truck, he repeatedly stabbed her in 
the arm, head, and neck. Id. at f 7. This Court held that the defendant's movement of the 
victim "was neither inconsequential nor incidental to the assault" because it "spanned the 
length of the apartment building" and the defendant could have stabbed the victim "at any 
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point after he grabbed the knife without confining or moving her." Lopez, 2001 UT App 
123 at 513. 
Also, in State v. Mecham, 2000 UT App 247, this Court addressed whether the 
defendant's binding of and confinement of victims constituted a separate offense from the 
robbery. In Mecham, the defendants escorted three movie-theatre employees, at 
gunpoint, from the downstairs portion of the building to the upstairs manager's office. 
State v. Mecham, 2000 UT App 247 at ff 3-5. After taking money from the manager's 
safe and forcing two more employees into the office with the other employees, the 
defendants left the building, "leaving all of the theatre employee's bound." Id. at f 7. 
This Court held that based on the trial court's observation, all the employees were bound 
and "it was unclear how long they would remain so before they were discovered or able 
to free themselves." Id. at f 33. Concluding that this was not a "typical robbery." Id. 
Therefore, the length of the restraint or detention is considered to determine whether it is 
slight, inconsequential, or merely incidental to the underlying offense. 
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court has found that a detention that furthers the 
purpose of the crime is "slight, inconsequential, and merely incidental to the other 
crimes." Finlayson, 2000 UT 10 at f 23. In Finlayson, the defendant lured his victim 
into his apartment under the guise of studying Japanese. Id. at ff 2-3. After his amorous 
advances to the victim were rejected, "the defendant then pulled her from the chair in 
which she was sitting, carried her into his bedroom with his arms around her body, and 
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sexually assaulted her." Finlayson, 2000 UT 10 at f 4. 
Relying on the principle of avoiding multiple convictions for "essentially the 
same conduct[,]" Finlayson, 2000 UT 10 zl\ 17, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that 
kidnappings and robberies involve a "necessary detention . . . [and] absent a clear 
distinction, virtually every rape and robbery would automatically be a kidnapping as 
well." Id. at f 19. As such, the Court found that defendant's carrying his victim into his 
bedroom and handcuffing her "while the sex crimes were in progress constituted a 
detention that was slight, inconsequential, and merely incidental to the other crimes." Id. 
at f 23. In the instant case, Campbell's actions were dissimilar to those in Lopez and 
Mecham, and yet more similar to those in Finlayson. 
Here, Campbell's handcuffing Allgood was slight and inconsequential to the 
aggravated robbery. First, unlike in Lopez, there was no asportation of Allgood; 
Campbell merely handcuffed Allgood so that he could "go through with the plan" 
without Allgood interfering. (R. 254: 369; 253: 220). And although movement of this 
type is not necessary to commit kidnapping, it is a threshold fact that distinguishes just a 
robbery from a robbery combined with a kidnapping. See, Finlayson, 2000 UT 10 at f 
23. In Finlayson, the Court found that the physical restraint of the victim , in order to 
sexually assault her, was incidental. Id. 
Moreover, unlike Mecham, Lopez, and Finlayson, Campbell did not move Allgood 
in order to commit the robbery, he only handcuffed Allgood to mitigate any interference 
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during the robbery. In Lopez, the defendant could have assaulted the victim at anytime 
before dragging her out of the building. Lopez, 2001 UT App 123 at f 13. Here, 
however, Campbell's handcuffing was slight an incidental to the robbery because it was 
in furtherance of the robbery and not some other crime. 
Furthermore, restraining Allgood was slight because Allgood was already 
incapacitated by the gunshot wound. Being handcuffed only slightly impeded AUgood's 
movement because it only partially restricted the movement of his arms, not his ability to 
move around freely as demonstrated by the fact that Allgood managed to call 911 (R. 
252: 31). 
B. The detention of Allgood is of the type inherent in a robbery. 
The State asserts that the handcuffing of Allgood is similar to the detention in 
Mecham in which the court refused to merge a kidnapping charge with the robbery 
charge of a movie theater. The State mischaracterizes the court's holding Mecham. In 
Mecham, this Court did hold that the binding and confining of the victims that occurred 
was not inherent in an aggravated robbery; rather it was "an additional act, completely 
independent of the act of taking property by force of threat of force." Mecham, 2000 UT 
App 247 at f 33. However, the court also stated that, "[t]he aggravated robbery in this 
case, and almost every aggravated robbery as a factual matter contain [ed] the elements 
needed to prove aggravated kidnapping." Id. at f 31. The court goes on to say; "The 
prosecutor must [have shown] that the detention was beyond the 'minimum inherent in 
6 
[aggravated robbery].'" Id. at f 30 (quoting State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89, 93 (Utah 1981)). 
In Mecham the detention was beyond the ''minimum inherent in aggravated 
robbery." Mecham, 2000 UT App at f 30. The defendants detained not only those 
necessary to complete the robbery, but additional employees as well. Id, at f 33. In fact, 
the defendants had completed the robbery when they encountered two ushers in the 
building and forced them back into the office and detained them also. Id. Also, the 
binding of the employees occurred after the cash was taken. Id. at ff 6-7. In addition, 
the defendants in Mecham told the victims that they were to stay there for a set amount of 
time, essentially threatening them and detaining them beyond the completion of the 
robbery. Id. The present facts, however, differ. 
Here, Allgood's detainment occurred before the robbery was completed and for 
the purpose of completing the robbery. Furthermore, Campbell did not detain anyone 
after completing the robbery nor did he further detain Allgood by threatening him or 
ordering him to stay for a certain period of time beyond his departure as in Mecham. The 
detainment began and effectively ended simultaneously with the commission of the 
robbery. 
Furthermore, Allgood's detention is of the type inherent in a robbery. Elemental 
to robbery is the requirement that it be committed "by means of force or fear." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-301(1) (2004). It is this force or fear which typically causes the 
detention. Thus, regardless of whether the detention arises from a threat of violence or 
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from physical force - e.g.., handcuffs - a detention is unavoidable and therefore inherent 
in the commission of a robbery. 
C. The detention did not have some significance independent of the other crime. 
It did not make the other crime substantially easier to commit or 
substantially lessen the risk of detection. 
The State asserts that the act of handcuffing Allgood made the robbery 
substantially easier to commit (Appellee Br. at 24-25). The State narrowly defines the 
typical robbery as one in which the "victim's detention consists of them simply standing 
still for a few brief moments." State v. Mecham, 2000 UT App 247, f 33. However, even 
in the "typical robberyf,]" the robbery is made substantially easier to commit by the 
detention of the victims in forcing them to "simply [stand] still for a few brief moments." 
Id. 
If this Court were to apply the State's rationale, the doctrine of merger would 
never apply because it would make "virtually every rape and robbery into a kidnapping as 
well." Finlayson, 2000 UT 10 at f 23. If the determination of merger was to be based on 
a simple finding that the act made the robbery easier to commit, the doctrine of merger 
would have no real purpose - every act of detainment serves in some way to make the 
robbery easier to commit. 
Furthermore, the detention was not done to avoid detection; rather it was done to 
accomplish the crime. As stated, Campbell handcuffed Allgood for the purpose of 
completing the crime. (R. 254: 369; 253: 220). Unlike in Mecham and Finlayson, 
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Campbell did not order or threaten Allgood to remain in a room for a certain period of 
time to facilitate his escape; rather, he left Allgood in the main section of the store. This 
is evidence further by the fact that Allgood was not restrained to the point where he could 
not call 911 or possibly leave the store. Therefore, it is more than reasonable to infer that 
the handcuffs would not have impeded Allgood from leaving the store either. 
Moreover, handcuffing Allgood did not make the crime substantially easier to 
commit or lessen the risk of detection. Finlayson, 2000 UT 10 at \ 23. Although 
unfortunate, the fact that Campbell had mortally wounded Allgood by shooting him with 
a .32 caliber revolver, the act of handcuffing Allgood was superfluous (R. 253: 183, 185, 
196). Already wounded, Allgood was no more incapacitated by being handcuffed than 
he already was from being shot. Because Allgood was severely wounded, handcuffing 
Allgood certainly did not make the crime substantially easier to commit or aid Campbell 
fleeing without detection. 
This is a case where there is no "clear distinction" between the facts surrounding 
the conviction for aggravated robbery, and those support a conviction for aggravated 
kidnapping. The detention did not have any significance independent of the aggravated 
robbery. It did not make the robbery any easier to commit than the ordinary detainment 
involved in any robbery would, nor did it substantially lessen the risk of detection more 
than would be present in any robbery. 
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I. TRIAL COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE WAS BOTH DEFICIENT AND 
PREJUDICIAL, 
The failure of trial counsel to move for the merger of the aggravated robbery and 
aggravated kidnapping charges constitutes deficient performance - it falls below an 
objective standard for reasonable conduct. In Finlayson, the Utah Supreme Court 
reviewed a similar merger issue for ineffective counsel. The Court concluded that the 
facts did not support a conviction for aggravated kidnapping and forcible rape/sodomy. 
The court's statement of the ineffectiveness of counsel is applicable to this case: 
Yet defendant's counsel made no objection to this charge [aggravated 
kidnapping], and failed to raise this at any time, either during trial or 
following the conviction in a motion to vacate. As this is an issue that 
would have been raised outside the presence of the jury, no possible 
prejudice would have inured to defendant. When no possible explanation or 
tactical reason exists for such a decision, we have held that the first part of 
the Strickland tes t . . . is satisfied. 
Finlayson, 2000 UT 10 at f 24 (citations omitted). Here, because "no possible 
explanation or tactical reason" existed which would justify trial counsel's decision not to 
address the merger issue, the first part of the Strickland test, as in Finlayson, is satisfied. 
Furthermore, the Court held in Finlayson that 
it is clear that the second part of the Strickland test has also been met. 
Objecting to the aggravated kidnapping charge in the trial court or moving 
to vacate the conviction would have precluded the court from properly 
allowed it. With this conviction, defendant has been prejudiced by the 
imposition of a ten-year-to-life sentence, which although concurrent, would 
likely increase the time the Board of Pardons and Parole would require him 
to serve. 
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Id, at f 25. Here, failure to argue the merger issue resulted in the Appellant being 
prejudiced by a compounded sentence of fifteen years to life for Aggravated Kidnapping 
(R. 222-23; 239-242). 
Here, the facts do not support a conviction for both aggravated kidnapping and 
aggravated robbery. Like in Finlayson, trial counsel was deficient in failing to raise this 
issue. Similarly, Mulder, like the defendant in Finlayson, was prejudiced by trial 
counsel's failure to raise this issue. In fact, prejudice to Mulder is greater than that to the 
defendant in Finlayson since Appellant was given a fifteen-year-to-life sentence that is to 
be served consecutively, not concurrently, to his other convictions (R. 222-23; 239-242). 
Accordingly, Mulder requests that this Court conclude that he was denied his 
constitutional right to competent counsel and that his conviction for aggravated 
kidnapping should be vacated because it merges into the conviction for aggravated 
robbery. 
II. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION FOR 
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING AND TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE 
IN FAILING TO MOVE FOR A DISMISSAL OF THAT CHARGE. 
A motion to dismiss the aggravated kidnapping charge would not be futile and 
trial counsel's failure to make such a motion amounts to a deficient performance, "in that 
it fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment," and that 
"counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial - i.e., that it affected the outcome of the 
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case." State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 19, 12 P.3d 92 (quoting Strickland v. 
Was/zmgton, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)). 
To establish Appellant's liability as an accomplice for aggravated kidnapping, the 
State had the burden of proving that he "knowingly or intentionally solicited, requested, 
commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided" Campbell to commit aggravated 
kidnapping. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1973). 
The State cites to evidence that was presented in proving Appellant's role in the 
aggravated robbery. Appellant does not contest the proof offered as to the aggravated 
robbery charge. However, proof of the aggravated robbery does not constitute proof of 
the aggravated kidnapping charge. If that were the case, statutory merger would apply, 
which as the State points out and the Appellant agrees does not apply (Appellee Br. at 20, 
n. 1). Also, participation in the planning of the aggravated robbery does not constitute 
proof of the added element of aggravated kidnapping. In fact, Campbell himself testified 
that the plan to use the handcuffs to detain Allgood was his, and his alone. When asked 
specifically if this was his "plan alone or was that discussed," he replied, "That concept 
was pretty much mine alone" (R. 253:201-02). 
The State also contends that inferences can be drawn that Appellant knew 
Campbell had handcuffs. It bases these inferences off evidence of another accomplice -
Appellant's girlfriend, Lori Shlegel's, knowledge of the handcuffs. Schlegel's knowledge 
is not contested, nor is it synonymous with or proof of Appellant's knowledge. Evidence 
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of Schlegel's knowledge is not evidence of Appellant's knowledge of, encouragement to, 
or aiding in aggravated kidnapping. Furthermore, Campbell did not testify that Appellant 
gave him the handcuffs, or instructed him or encouraged him to use the handcuffs, and 
there was no evidence that Appellant solicited, requested, commanded, or encouraged 
Campbell to use the gun. 
Even if those inferences can be drawn from the evidence presented, this does not 
amount to proof that Mulder "knowingly or intentionally solicited, requested, 
commanded, encouraged, or intentionally aided" in the commission of the aggravated 
kidnapping. A knowledge that Campbell was in possession of handcuffs or duct tape 
does not prove the required elements of aggravated kidnapping. The statutory definition 
of the crime requires that Appellant did more than knew about the possibility of a 
detention it requires Mulder to have "solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or 
intentionally aided" in committing aggravated kidnapping. Knowledge alone would not 
satisfy that burden. 
The State goes on to assert that Campbell's testimony of his conversation with 
Appellant after the robbery amounts to proof of his involvement in the aggravated 
kidnapping. However, as previously stated, the detainment effectively ended when the 
robbery ended. Any knowledge that Appellant may have had acquired after the fact, was 
just that - knowledge after the fact and would not constitute proof that Appellant, 
"knowingly or intentionally solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or 
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intentionally aided" in the commission of the aggravated kidnapping. 
Appellant concurs with the State in its assertion that counsel is not required to 
make futile motions; however, the motion to dismiss would not have been futile. The 
State did not present evidence sufficient to support a jury's finding beyond a reasonable 
doubt that defendant was an accomplice to aggravated kidnapping. And as state in 
Finlayson, 
Yet defendant's counsel made no objection to this charge [aggravated 
kidnapping], and failed to raise this at any time, either during trial or 
following the conviction in a motion to vacate. As this is an issue that 
would have been raised outside the presence of the jury, no possible 
prejudice would have inured to defendant. When no possible explanation or 
tactical reason exists for such a decision, we have held that the first part of 
the Strickland tes t . . . is satisfied. 
Finlayson, 2000 UT 10 at f 24 (citations omitted). 
Therefore, trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to move for dismissal of 
the aggravated kidnapping charge. This deficient performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment. Moreover, Mulder was prejudiced by 
counsel's deficient performance because he stands convicted of a crime without sufficient 
evidence and he was sentenced to fifteen-years-to-life on that conviction, a sentence that 
he was ordered to serve consecutively and not concurrently with his convictions. This 
sentence greatly lengthens the time he will serve when combined with the other two 
charges. This is particularly egregious considering that Campbell, the principal actor in 
all three crimes, is serving a single five-years-to-life sentence. 
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Accordingly, Mulder respectfully requests this Court to vacate his conviction for 
aggravated kidnapping because the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction and 
his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move for its dismissal. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Mulder asks that this Court reverse his conviction for Aggravated Kidnapping on 
the grounds set forth in Appellant's briefs. 
DATED this 20th day of August, 2009. 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY 
Counsel for Appellant 
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